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Abstract. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett claims that evolution is 
algorithmic. On Dennett’s analysis, evolutionary processes are trivially algorithmic 
because he assumes that all natural processes are algorithmic. I will argue that there 
are more robust ways to understand algorithmic processes which make the claim 
that evolution is algorithmic empirical and not conceptual. While laws of nature can 
be seen as compression algorithms of information about the world, it does not 
follow logically that they are implemented as algorithms by physical processes. For 
that to be true, the processes have to be part of computational systems. The basic 
difference between mere simulation and real computing is having proper causal 
structure. I will show what kind of requirements this poses for natural evolutionary 
processes if they are to be computational. 
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Daniel Dennett made a claim that evolution is algorithmic (Dennett 1995: 
60). Several authors objected that on Dennett’s analysis, evolutionary 
processes could be trivially algorithmic because he assumes that all 
natural processes are algorithmic (Fodor 1996: 253, Ahouse 1998: 361-
363; cf. Dennett 1995: 59). This objection is misleading if all natural 
processes aren’t algorithmic in the sense Dennett wants evolution to be 
algorithmic. It isn’t at all trivial that evolution is algorithmic if all physical 
processes aren’t computational. Pancomputationalism, or universal 
computationalism is the claim that all physical processes are 
computational but this, on my strict criteria of computing, will turn out 
false (for other criticisms of universal computationalism, see Piccinini 
2007). The question is how to understand “algorithmic”. What would 
make the claim about the evolution true? 
There are processes effectively describable by computations 
(“algorithmic” in Gregory Chaitin’s sense of algorithmic information 
theory, cf. Chaitin 1975), and processes that realize digital computations. 
(I am ignoring analog computation here for two reasons. There is no 
standard analog computation algorithm theory, and the claim I am trying 
to evaluate is far more controversial when it refers to digital computation.) 
In what sense are evolutionary processes algorithmic? 
All natural processes are algorithmically describable. In this regard, 
Dennett was right to say they are algorithmic. This is trivial, given the 
standard algorithmic information theory, though die-hard materialists 
would probably disagree (see Mahner and Bunge 1997). Yet it’s highly 
controversial that any biological or evolutionary processes are 
computational. While laws of nature can be seen as compression 
algorithms of information about the world, it doesn’t follow logically that 
they are implemented as algorithms by physical processes. For that to be 
true, the processes have to be part of computational systems. The basic 
difference between mere simulation and real computing is having proper 
causal structure (Scheutz 2002). Dennett is probably right if he means 
the weaker claim (evolution can be simulated), and there aren’t many 
reasons to think he’s right if he means the stronger, computational claim. 
That’s why Gould (1997) could be right but not because of the reasons 
that he referred to, as I will show. 
Dennett has to defend the specific claim about evolution independently 
from any claims about all processes, if he didn’t mean the first one to be 
a trivial consequence. However, Dennett’s definition of algorithmic 
processes cannot account for the simulation/computing distinction. 
Algorithmic processes, according to Dennett, have three features: 
 
1. substrate neutrality 
2. underlying mindlessness 
3. guaranteed results 
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The problem is that all functionally describable processes share these 
features. For example, the process of opening a can be realized using a 
simple, hand-operated device or engine-driven device, so it’s substrate 
neutral. Opening the can isn’t rocket science, either, and it has 
guaranteed results (ceteris paribus). All computational processes are 
functionally specifiable processes but they have more distinguishing 
features. A hand-operated can opener isn’t a computer, after all. If we fail 
to see that, we will follow Putnam-Searle fallacy of ascribing any 
computation to any process: Nothing would disallow ascribing realization 
of Wordstar program to Searle’s notorious wall (Searle 1992: 207-208). 
Moreover, any disjunction of states of the processes can be thought to 
realize a computational process, and using arbitrary disjunctions on 
sufficiently complicated systems, we could ascribe them any possible 
computation. These results aren’t only counterintuitive; they follow from a 
definitional fiat that Searle and Putnam made: They understand 
computation as a purely syntactic (or formal) object. 
Searle argues “syntax is not intrinsic to physics” (Searle 1992: 210). If 
Searle means that physics isn’t linguistics, he’s right. Nevertheless, he’s 
wrong to treat algorithms as purely formal syntactic objects. This 
formalism, if consistent, would make him deny the reality of all 
mathematical properties ascribed by physicists. It isn’t the fact that all 
mathematical properties ascribed in physics are observer-relative. 
Properties of computer programs are just the same as the rest. They 
should be ascribed in the same way science generally ascribes 
mathematical values to objects. 
Computational systems 
Contrary to such broad realization concepts, stricter criteria have been 
recently proposed (see Miłkowski 2006, Scheutz 2001). The list that I’ll 
present is preliminary, and I’ll supplement it with a general requirement 
connected with functional systems as such. 
Computational systems are functional systems. There are at least three 
ways to analyze these systems, according to the notion of function used. 
First, there is Cummins’ notion of function as causal role of a part of the 
system (Cummins 1975). Second, there are history-based notions, such 
as defined by Wright (1973) or Millikan (1984). Third, there’s a design-
based notion of function, as defined by Ulrich Krohs (2004). Cummins’ 
notion is very broad, and makes any causal role a function – for example, 
the function of the trash can lid is making noise in the middle of the night. 
According to history-based notions, the function is the cause (a reason) 
that a thing that has it exists, so prototypes have no functions. Krohs’ 
notion needs a little more explanation. 
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Krohs suggests that all functional systems have design that specifies 
system parts in terms of part types. For example, if I want to assemble 
my IKEA table, I read the manual (the design specs) that specifies the 
screws, but not as individuals with proper names or located in space-
time, but as types. In case of biological systems, the genotype specifies 
the design. Human-made functional artifacts have parts selected as types 
by humans; other functional systems are selected by other mechanisms 
(natural selection seems the most obvious one). This notion has an 
obvious advantage: the design stance descriptions are literally 
descriptions based on ascribing design ascriptions. For this very reason, 
this notion seems appropriate for analyzing Dennett’s claims: The design 
stance would turn out to be based on the notion of design. The task of re-
engineering of artifacts and biological systems could be then 
reformulated as the task of rediscovering their design: their specification 
in terms of part types and relation of these parts. 
Based on these three kinds of notions, three types of functional systems 
could be defined. The choice of the notion has deeper consequences – 
probably anything would be a functional system in Cummins’ terms but 
not according to other notions. Prototype systems won’t be functional in 
Millikan’s terms, and systems without type-level specifiable parts won’t be 
functional if we accept Krohs’ criteria. This means, for example, that 
dissipative systems which are easily described as wholes in terms of 
types aren’t functional: Their individual parts cannot be picked out using 
any type-level description—there aren’t type-selection mechanisms that 
would allow for functional ascriptions. Just because dissipative systems 
are physical systems but not functional systems, they cannot be 
computational systems, and universal computationalism is false. At the 
same time, universal computationalism goes hand in hand with Cummins’ 
like functions because parts of dissipative systems could be ascribed 
causal roles. 
The computational description should offer new predictions or 
explanations. If it isn’t the case, the computational description of a given 
system is redundant, and it’s safe to say that the system isn’t 
computational. For example, working of a can opener can be described 
without stipulating any computation; the can opener doesn’t need to 
process any information about the can to open it (at least that’s how 
today’s can openers work). This is just a general rule of stipulating 
higher-level properties; if lower-level properties are sufficient to predict or 
explain the behavior and innards of a system, it makes little sense to 
ascribe higher-lever properties (e.g., it’s just as useless to ascribe 
intentional properties to a lawn). The rule can be spelled out more 
precisely in terms of Chaitin’s algorithmic information theory: the 
computational description must be simpler than the lower-lever 
description (a general causal-role level description) and offer epistemic 
advantages such as new predictions and explanations. The simplicity 
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boils down to the length of the description (it’s equivalent to the 
compression ratio of the new description compared to the old one). This 
requirement conflicts with trivial versions of universal computationalism. If 
universal computationalism could offer new insights for every single 
physical object, then it would be compatible with the requirement. 
The description must be applied consistently for all events in the physical 
system. We can easily imagine “cheating”: devising ascription rules that 
are far more complex than the system being described, picking out 
arbitrary disjunctions of states, and so on. This requirement is obvious 
but notorious “proofs” that any system can perform any computation 
(Putnam 1987) are so widespread that we should be explicit about the 
ascription rules. Anyway, that’s how natural sciences ascribe 
mathematical properties, so it shouldn’t be controversial. 
Ascriptions of sequences of computational states to the system must 
reflect its causal history. This is just an extension of the consistency 
requirement into causality. Arbitrary disjunctions of states won’t count as 
causal history so they cannot be described as real computation. This also 
disallows universal computationalism based only on formal tricks. 
The system realizing computations is relatively isolated from the 
environment. Only functional systems are computational systems, and a 
system is functional only when it has identifiable boundaries. The 
boundaries could be blurry but they must delineate the system from the 
environment. I would define system boundaries in terms of causal relation 
frequency: causal relations are more frequent inside the system than 
outside. Even input-output causal relations with a computational system 
don’t make inputs automatically inner values: input relations can obtain 
with many different objects, which mean that they will be less frequent 
than real inner relations. If input relations are always connected with the 
same object or process, this process is a part of the system. This way my 
delineation criteria help to understand why the notion of extended mind 
seems intuitive in some cases: it’s intuitive only when a remote part of the 
cognitive system is in fact its subsystem. 
It could be argued that some other physical property (other than causal 
relation relative frequency) should be used to define system boundaries. 
For example, those who oppose extended mind theories could claim that 
system boundaries should be spelled out in functional type-level terms of 
system organization. This kind of system boundary definition is 
acceptable, as well. What is important is the fact that system boundaries 
should be definable not only on a computational level of description. Note 
that arbitrary process state disjunctions nor Searle’s wall cannot be 
clearly delineated on any other level than computational. This poses also 
another difficulty for universal computationalists because it requires them 
to show that all physical objects are parts of relatively isolated physical 
systems. 
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As I already mentioned, computational systems normally have input 
states. On the one hand, input data can be internal part of the algorithm 
the system is implementing. The output data, on the other hand, must be 
always present. Input and output states should be specifiable, as before, 
not only on a computational level of description. Note that Searle’s wall 
has no clear input states: there is no wall equivalent of the keyboard nor 
of the display. Searle hasn’t shown any clear way to pick output states 
nor input states from the set of all states of his wall. There is no 
computation without output states. Any object can be ascribed a trivially 
simple output value: Any property could be said to encode it. But this 
property must be causally related to the input value. So while most 
objects could be assigned trivial identity transformation (the output 
property is the input property), non-trivial computations are harder to 
show. 
The input/output requirement is a result of the standard computation 
definition in terms of recursive functions (as normally Church-Turing 
thesis is understood). The whole computational process in the system 
must have a description in terms of recursive function (or any other 
equivalent model of computation, like Markov strings, Turing machines, 
register machines etc.). Computational ascription is a real ascription only 
on the condition that we know what computation we are ascribing. The 
computation should be spelled out precisely as code or—at least—as 
pseudo-code. 
To sum up, there are several criteria of computational ascriptions: 
 
1. computational description simplicity, predictive and explanatory value 
2. description consistency for all processes in the system; causal 
determination of ascriptions 
3. relative system isolation and non-computational boundaries 
4. availability of output states connected causally with input states (if 
any) 
5. specification of code-level description 
 
The concept of function realization, which subsumes the realization of 
computations, depends on how broadly we understand functions. On the 
design-based notion, pancomputationalism is false. Is Dennett’s 
computational claim false as well? 
Evolution as computation 
The above top-down analysis of computational systems shows that if 
there’s a real computational level of description of natural evolutionary 
processes, this cannot be the only level of their description. Could a 
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computational description of evolutionary processes fulfill the 
abovementioned criteria?  
The computational description will be simpler than the lower-level 
physical description. Its explanatory value remains, however, at best 
controversial: It isn’t at all clear what it would explain. Origin of biological 
information as selected from the chaos? Or the way natural selection 
works? The predictive value isn’t clear neither. Whereas the general 
algorithm of evolution could predict the way natural selection works in 
every case, it would probably be highly dependent on the complete 
knowledge of environmental constraints and details of evolution units 
being selected. It isn’t clear that these predictions wouldn’t be available in 
the modern neo-Darwinian Synthesis. For the sake of argument, let us 
suppose that we would gain an insight into how evolution, or Mother 
Nature in Dennett’s terms, processes information about replicators and 
interactors (Brandon 1998). 
We would apply the description consistently, based on causal relations. 
Therefore, we assume that consistency requirement would be fulfilled. 
Evolutionary processes are probably relatively easy to single out from 
other processes (say, geological) but it isn’t obvious whether the most 
relevant elements of these processes have any function in the 
evolutionary computational systems. Are evolutionary processes like 
dissipative processes? According to the more robust, design-based 
notion of function, physical processes can implement algorithms but not 
all kinds of physical processes are computational: Those that form non-
linear and non-aggregative systems that strongly depend on token-only 
properties like space-time localization cannot have functional elements. If 
it could be shown that the way evolutionary processes run depends only 
on their localization (or any purely token-level property), Dennett’s claim 
would be false. At the first glance, this is what Gould wants us to believe: 
Crank your algorithm of natural selection to your heart's content, and you 
cannot grind out the contingent patterns built during the earth's geological 
history. You will get predictable pieces here and there (convergent 
evolution of wings in flying creatures), but you will also encounter too 
much randomness from a plethora of sources, too many additional 
principles from within biological theory, and too many unpredictable 
impacts from environmental histories beyond biology (including those 
occasional meteors)—all showing that the theory of natural selection must 
work in concert with several other principles of change to explain the 
observed pattern of evolution (Gould 1997). 
Gould thinks that contingency – responsible for all variability of the 
population – plays such an important role in natural selection that its 
algorithm cannot be realistic without considering this contingency. 
However, contingencies, or initial state of the environment fed into the 
computational evolutionary process can be treated in two ways: first, they 
can be described using lossy compression, and second, simply be input 
into the more complex computational system. Both ways are compatible 
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with a notion of algorithm realization. What Gould hasn’t shown is that 
these contingencies would make the natural selection algorithm 
computationally intractable because of the combinatorial explosion. 
To answer the question whether it would be computationally tractable, we 
need the code. What should this code compute? A general natural 
selection problem or a specific selection problem? According to Gould, 
we could produce an algorithm for convergent evolution, so this could be 
a third possibility. 
Let’s start with the first possibility: a general natural selection algorithm. 
The fitness of units being selected naturally shows that the solution of the 
problem of adapting to environment was effectively solved. I would 
propose that the evolutionary algorithm solves the problem of adaptation, 
and this fitness or the adapted population could be thought of as output 
value of the computation. Maybe the interaction with environment could 
produce the input of this algorithm. 
Some hints about what evolutionary computational systems are and what 
kind of computations they realize can be found in computer science. 
Research on artificial life or evolutionary algorithms seems to suggest 
that though there are emergent properties and strong context-
dependence of properties, at the same time objects are computational 
(Crutchfield and Mitchell 1995). It’s an empirical question whether natural 
evolutionary processes are like dissipative systems or rather like Artificial 
Life. 
Evolutionary algorithms are heuristic search algorithms modeled after 
natural processes (Michalewicz 1996). They involve generating and 
mutating a population of artificial organisms, and testing them according 
to a fitness function. The fitness is assessed based on how well the given 
organism finds a solution to a problem. There are various types of 
evolutionary algorithms, and not all properties and types of evolutionary 
algorithms are now known. Most likely, existing evolutionary algorithms 
are only a small subclass of all possible evolutionary algorithms. 
Compared to natural processes, artificial ones are less complex but can 
serve as a starting point for evaluating Dennett’s claim. 
The problem with the code inspired by the research on evolutionary 
algorithms is that it cannot be adopted directly. The overall structure of 
evolutionary algorithms is as follows: 
 
procedure evolution 
begin 
t=0 
determine_starting_P(t)   
(* P(t) – Population P at time t *) 
final t)
while not (final_condition) do 
_condition=(evaluate P(  >threshold) 
begin 
t=t+1 
select P(t) (* from P(t-1) *) 
modify P(t) 
final_condition=(evaluate P(t) >threshold) 
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e
end 
nd 
 
The problem is that this algorithm is based on the evaluate() function. 
This function is however encoded by the programmer, not discovered by 
the algorithm itself. No general algorithm of fitness assessment seems 
viable, though here various flavors of adaptationism could have their say. 
In nature, the encoding of the fitness function is unknown. The fitness 
landscape is not represented numerically in reality. Therefore, the 
straightforward application of such algorithms results in a very 
unsatisfactory code: 
 
procedure evolution 
begin 
t=0 
fix starting P(t) 
while not (the_end_of_the_world) do 
 begin 
 t=t+1 
 select_naturally_in_environment P(t) 
 modify P(t) 
 end 
end 
 
This code cannot possibly fulfill the requirement of explanatory value. It 
isn’t giving any new predictions, and seems only a trivial and redundant 
reformulation of known causal mechanisms of natural selection. 
Replacing the explicit fitness function representation with ways of 
discovering the environmental constraints might be one of the ways out of 
this problem.  Natural evolutionary computation cannot represent fitness 
functions that merely make it easier to humans to simulate the causal 
relations between populations and their environment. 
However, it might be argued that general code structure is, in principle, 
always sketchy and trivial. What we need to find is a specific code for 
specific evolutionary processes. It might be inspired by current research 
on evolutionary algorithms or not. In other ways, we should use the 
bottom-up method to try to find the code. 
So I turn to the second possibility, namely to the code computing a 
specific natural selection process. The arms race between bacteria and 
antibiotics has been simulated “in silico” by various researches. It’s even 
possible to use “in silico” models to discover new drugs (Gray and Keck 
1999). These models start with bacteria genome sequences and proteins 
expressed by genomes, and knowledge about genes that are crucial for 
the survival of the bacteria. Such massive data can be then used to 
predict if certain bacteria or their mutation can survive at all. The general 
structure of the first algorithm could be used, with appropriate 
substitutions. The evaluate function would test if the bacteria survives 
when certain proteins are destroyed; it wouldn’t require a separate 
representation. 
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Does it allow us to say that computational simulation of bacteria vs. 
antibiotics is really algorithm realization? Not at all. Current “in silico” 
methods often use data gathered from parallel in vivo experiments 
because scientists still don’t know what’s being ignored in the simulation. 
The simulation doesn’t include all the causal-functional details, and some 
of them probably should be disregarded for the sake of simplicity in many 
cases. Nevertheless, the detailed “in silico” experiment could, in principle, 
fulfill all criteria of computation realization. 
What about convergent evolution? Gould clearly sees that there is a 
regular pattern in the evolution of the wing in many species. The 
evolution of the wing could be regarded as an engineering problem, 
requiring optimization methods. Evolutionary algorithms are used for 
airplane wing optimization (Keane and Petruzzelli 2000), and a 
recombination of the existing wing optimization with special organic wing 
requirements would give us an algorithm for selecting the wing in many 
different species. The fitness function would be based on aerodynamic 
features and general engineering principles. 
Specific algorithms aren’t prone to the problem of how to evaluate the 
fitness generally. Yet all three sketched algorithms share another 
disadvantage. They are simulation algorithms rather than algorithms of 
natural information processing. It cannot be proved that there isn’t any 
other algorithm for natural selection in play, as the problem of existence 
of any algorithm for something is itself not decidable in general: the only 
way to prove that there is an algorithm for something is to show it. 
Biologists, even computational biologists, generally don’t seek for 
computational structure in natural selection. They either build artificial 
computational systems with biological parts or simulate biological 
processes. This could mean that, after all, Dennett was right that there 
are algorithmic processes in vivo. But only in Chaitin’s sense of the term. 
Dennett’s definition of algorithmic process is redundant then, and reduces 
easily to the Chaitin’s technical term. That’s why it doesn’t account for 
simulation/computation distinction. Simulation can sometimes produce a 
genuine article, for example in a simulated theorem prover. However, in 
case of evolutionary algorithms it’s only a description of evolutionary 
processes that they produce, and not adapted populations. Moreover, a 
description shouldn’t be confused with what it describes. 
Algorithm, natural law, real pattern? 
So maybe Dennett’s claim isn’t about computational powers of evolution 
but rather about real, multiple-realizable patterns of evolution. These 
patterns are algorithmic in Chaitin’s sense: they aren’t stochastic, and 
there is a way to see regularity in them. After all, the biological data is not 
all but noise. 
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A vague usage of “algorithm” is often found in biological papers. Manfred 
Eigen writes “Our task is to find an algorithm, a natural law that leads to 
the origin of information” (Eigen 1992, 12). As Mayr notes, biologists 
often use “models”, “algorithms”, “theories”, “conjectures” interchangeably 
(Mayr 1997). The problem with this usage, which is roughly compatible 
with Chaitin’s notion of the algorithmic, is that nature doesn’t realize 
algorithms for describing the natural processes, and Chaitin’s algorithms 
are algorithms for describing sequences of information. Therefore, while 
a process could be algorithmic in Chaitin’s sense, there could be no 
algorithm that it implements. The implementation could be found 
somewhere else, for example in a human observer. In other words, 
evolutionary processes are algorithmic in this sense but aren’t 
necessarily doing any computations whatsoever. 
This notion of the algorithmic is completely compatible with multiple 
realizability and substrate neutrality. In short, all functionally specifiable 
processes are algorithmic in Chaitin’s sense, and algorithmic descriptions 
could be re-used (as non-token level descriptions) to refer to potentially 
many objects, also made of some other stuff. This leads to a conclusion 
that multiple realizability of natural selection could be still maintained but 
natural selection would be no algorithm, only a process in functional 
systems. But would anyone try to argue with it?  
The weaker reading of Dennett’s claim would still face resistance. In 
principle, functional systems could include cultural processes – as 
suggested by memetics – or various units of natural selection. There are 
materialists who claim that it is stuff that matters, and they would object 
that natural selection isn’t multiple realizable nor functional (Mahner and 
Bunge 2001). However, this notion of algorithmic processes doesn’t 
involve any implementation of formal properties or “syntax” by natural 
selection and this is the premise on which their objection depends, just 
like in the case of Searle. 
Yes, natural selection processes are lawful and not stochastic. They are 
real patterns. Yes, this is trivial. And it’s much more interesting to see 
their functional structure in specific cases rather than to say they’re 
generally algorithmic. 
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